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Introduction
One of the most controversial issues in natural resources
law is whether interests in water are property. In the western
United States, water is typically viewed by appropriators as a
form of private property, while in the East it is not. In either
case, the law is surprisingly unsettled, notwithstanding the
important consequences that follow, particularly under 
constitutional takings jurisprudence.
Treating water as property has significant implications for
investment, conservation and environmental protection as well.
Establishing secure property rights can foster stewardship and
wise investment of labor and capital. By the same token, the
absence of property ownership can result in a “tragedy of the
commons,” where a common resource is plundered as each 
selfish, yet economically rational, actor takes steps to promote
self-interest with little regard for externalities that deplete the
resource. On the other hand, public ownership of water is
deeply embedded in western legal traditions, in recognition
that water is essential to all life and must be safeguarded to 
prevent depletion and ensure satisfaction of a broad range of
public needs.
This brief essay considers whether interests in surface water
are property. Just over a year ago, in Spear T. Ranch v. Knaub,2
the Nebraska Supreme Court held “no,” but provided scant
analysis in support of its conclusion. We assess both the nature
of property and the nature of water, and then turn to the 
implications of treating water as property (or not) in Nebraska.
These topics are the subject of a longer article in progress,
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I. What is Property and Why Do 
We Care?
Property law helps create and safeguard stable relationships
between persons and things, allowing property owners to
extract the greatest value from that relationship and to protect
it against competing claims.3 Characterizing a thing as property
has significant legal ramifications. First, it is essential for 
establishing a Fifth Amendment takings claim against the
United States or an expropriation claim under international
investment treaties.4 Characterization as property has many
other important legal consequences. Take remedies, for example.
Property rules are often enforced through injunctions, in 
contrast with tort or contract liabilities, which typically lead to
monetary relief. Classification as property may also be 
determinative of issues involving mortgaging, the creation of
present and future interests, and special treatment under 
federal or state tax laws (like conservation easements,
amortization, or like-kind exchanges).
In spite of its importance, the concept of property is 
frustratingly ambiguous. According to the Restatement (First)
of the Law of Property, the term describes “legal relations
between persons with respect to a thing.”5 But of course, not all
economic relationships give rise to property rights, and herein
lies the rub, as they say. According to the Supreme Court, “only
those economic advantages are ‘rights’ which have the law in
back of them.”6 In Klamath Irrigation District  v. U.S., the 
federal claims court framed its struggle to define water rights
as follows:
What is property? The derivation of the word is
simple enough, arising from the Latin proprietas
or “ownership,” in turn stemming from proprius,
meaning “own” or “proper.” But, this etymology
reveals little. Philosophers such as Aristotle . . .
and Locke each, in turn, have debated the meaning
of this term, as later did legal luminaries such as
Blackstone, Madison and Holmes . . . 7
Among the scholars and jurists cited by the court, surely Sir
William Blackstone is the most familiar to property law 
aficionados. The American view of private property in land has
been indelibly shaped by Blackstone, who described it as “that
sole and despotic dominion . . . over the external things of the
world, in total exclusion of the right of any other.”8 Ironically, it
is highly unlikely that landowners enjoyed unfettered rights to
real property when this phrase was penned, and Blackstone
himself expressed some misgivings about the notion of 
exclusive dominion. Regardless, the concept is still influential
today and has taken on near-mythical proportions among
property rights proponents.
No doubt, exclusivity is a key feature of a property right;
some have argued that it is in fact the key feature of property.9
One way to break down the concept of property is to consider
whether an interest in a thing enjoys the standard incidents of
property ownership: the right to use (or not), the right to 
convey, and especially the right to exclude. Interests in water, as
described below, are neither exclusive nor freely conveyable.
Although such interests include usage, it is forbidden to not use
water for speculative, aesthetic, or any other purpose. Yet, this
begs the question—if exclusivity or one of the other incidents
is lacking or severely diminished, are we dealing with 
something other than property?  
Here is where the “bundle of sticks” metaphor may be 
useful. Though this conceptual tool has garnered its share of
criticism, it has been employed by countless law professors to
illustrate the nature of interests in property to first year 
students, and has become part of the “intellectual zeitgeist” of
American property law.10 The bundle represents the sum total
of rights one can have with respect to a parcel of land.
The sticks in the bundle can be disaggregated without defeating
the characterization of the parcel as property. A reversion, a life
estate, a remainder, and a fee simple determinable each 
represent but one stick in the bundle of legally protected 
property interests. Likewise, a right to exclude, to use, and to
convey are each but one stick in the bundle. Collectively, the
various estates or, in the second example, the various incidents,
add up to the whole bundle: the fee simple absolute.
What does the metaphor tell us about things other than
land, specifically, water? For one thing, it illustrates that 
perhaps public rights in navigation, fisheries, recreation or
water quality can comprise one of the sticks in the bundle 
without completely eviscerating the notion that a private interest
to use the water is indeed property. But if we remove the 
exclusivity stick, which represents the very essence of property
ownership, does the entire bundle fall apart, leaving us with a
few scattered twigs, but not property? Conversely, are there still
enough of the incidents or attributes of property left to justify
treating the interest in water as property? In effect, this exercise
brings us back to square one, but at the same time it prompts
us to take a closer look at water and the various interests that
are asserted in water.
II. Water is a Unique Public 
Trust Resource
There are at least two possible ways to unbundle the notion
of property in water. The first is to consider whether water is a
thing that is ever subject to ownership as a form of property.
In other words, do water and relationships to water possess the
essential characteristics of property: exclusivity, use, and 
transferability? Although this approach fosters stability in the
rule of law, it is quite inflexible.11 As first year law students
learn, there are very few absolutes in the law. Yet, the Nebraska
Supreme Court appears to have taken this path in the Spear T
cases, described in Part III below.
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An alternative path is to review the caselaw that has
addressed the issue in various contexts and draw conclusions
from those cases about the fundamental nature of water.
Courts employ this method frequently, although they do not
always articulate it as such. In International News Service v.
Associated Press,12 for example, the Supreme Court characterized
the news as “quasi-property” for purposes of a dispute between
newspapers, but refused to recognize property rights against
the general public. This contextual approach allows decision-
makers to treat a thing or relationship as property in one 
circumstance but not necessarily others, and in doing so it 
promotes flexible, equitable results.
Both alternatives require a close look at the elemental
nature of water. Water is a unique resource. It is essential to all
life. Its physical properties are unlike any other thing. There is
no capacity for exclusive possession or use of water in a stream,
a lake or even an irrigation ditch. It is constantly moving along
the surface, seeping into the ground, evaporating into the air,
and being taken up by plants, fish and other aquatic species.
Quantities are never entirely certain; drought, precipitation,
and even the practices of other users create ever-changing 
circumstances.
According to Professor Joseph Sax, who has written 
frequently on the nature of property rights, the uniqueness of
water as a legal concern is universally acknowledged:
The roots of private property have never been
deep enough to vest in water users a compensable
right to diminish lakes and rivers or to destroy the
marine life within them. Water is not like a pocket
watch or a piece of furniture, which an owner may
destroy with impunity. The rights of use in water,
however long standing, should never be confused
with more personal, more fully owned, property.13
In systems built on English common law, surface water is
viewed as a type of “public trust” resource, where the sovereign
retains rights and responsibilities to protect the resource for the
public. The public trust doctrine traces its pedigree to Roman
law. Because water is an essential resource upon which all life
depends, navigable waterways, tidal areas, shorelines and
stream beds cannot be held exclusively in private hands, but are
impressed with the jus publicum, the public right. Although the
doctrine was adopted in the United States through the 
incorporation of English common law, there is “an astonishingly
universal regard for communal values in water worldwide.”14
A review of Asian, African, Islamic and Native American laws
reveals rivulets of the public trust doctrine flowing from all
reaches of the basins of the world.15
The public trust doctrine has enjoyed modern staying
power in caselaw at both the federal and state level. In the 
eastern United States, it undergirds the law of “reasonable use,”
where riparian land owners have usufructuary rights to water
that flows through or past their land, but may not deplete the
flow in a way that harms other riparians or interferes with 
public access. In the West, the doctrine is embodied in 
provisions that give authority to the state to administer 
appropriative systems and ensure beneficial use of water
resources. The public trust, however, has rarely acted a 
significant curb on private appropriators’ rights to water. In a
marked deviation from this trend, the Supreme Court of
California imposed it in National Audubon Society v. Superior
Court (the Mono Lake case):
The state as sovereign retains continuing supervisory
control over its navigable waters and the lands
beneath those waters. This principle, fundamental
to the concept of the public trust, applies to rights
in flowing waters as well as to rights in tidelands
and lakeshores; it prevents any party from acquiring
a vested right to appropriate water in a manner
harmful to the interests protected by the public
trust.16
The Mono Lake decision is frequently cited by courts all
across the nation, but it has had relatively little on-the-ground
impact on the exploitation of water resources outside of
California and a handful of other jurisdictions. Even so, the
public trust doctrine is expressed in western legislation and
caselaw through constraints on the use and conveyance of
water, both of which are heavily regulated.
III. The Nature of Water Rights 
in Nebraska 
Over-appropriation has become an almost insurmountable
problem throughout Nebraska and in many watersheds of the
West. This is hardly surprising. Prior appropriation arose 
during the late 1800s as a way to maximize use and promote
settlement and economic development, and in fact it did just
that, with little regard for the long-term sustainability of the
resource or the communities—ecological and human—that rely
on it.17
The prior appropriation regime, often described as “first in
time, first in right,” is an expedient means of determining who
gets water, how much she gets and when. The Nebraska
Supreme Court has described this system of distributing water
according to appropriators’ respective priorities as “undoubtedly
enacted in furtherance of a wise public policy to afford an 
economical and speedy remedy to those whose rights are
wrongfully disregarded by others, as well as to prevent waste,
and to avoid unseemly controversies that may occur where
many persons are entitled to share in a limited supply of public
water for the purposes of irrigation.”18
In the West, private interests in water use are typically
ensconced in state constitutions. The Colorado constitution, for
example, provides that “the right to divert the unappropriated
waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be
➡
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denied.”19 Yet another provision specifies that water is “the
property of the state, and the same is dedicated to the use of the
people of the state, subject to appropriation . . .”20 Courts have
held that these provisions create compensable property rights
to use water.21
Nebraska’s constitution is similar, with an important 
distinction. It first provides that the use of water is dedicated to
the people of the state, and goes on to proclaim: “The right to
divert unappropriated waters of every natural stream for 
beneficial use shall never be denied except when such denial is
demanded by the public interest.”22 This language has been 
construed by the Nebraska Supreme Court as allowing the 
legislature to define the “public interest.”23 Accordingly, statutes
allow only beneficial use, require permits, forbid waste, and
prohibit non-use through forfeiture provisions.24 The legislature
has also restricted transfers between domestic, industrial, and
agricultural preference categories, and imposed strict 
requirements on transfers within each category to prevent
harm to other appropriators.25 More recently, the state has
taken strides toward sustainable, integrated management of
surface and groundwater resources through the enactment and
implementation of LB 962 and other measures,26 some of
which might not have been possible if private interests in water
were viewed as inviolate property rights.
In its 2005 opinion in Spear T. Ranch v. Knaub, the
Nebraska Supreme Court summed up these provisions to 
conclude that “[a] right to appropriate surface water . . . is not
an ownership of property.”27 As unequivocal as this sounds, the
court tempered its statement in the next line: “Instead, the
water is viewed as a public want and the appropriation is a right
to use the water.”28 One might view this as a distinction 
without a difference, because rights to water have always been
recognized as usufructuary—a right to use but not outright
ownership in the corpus of the water in situ.29 Given the
usufructuary nature of water rights, appropriators’ expectations
of exclusive enjoyment are far less than those of landowners.30
The distinction between ownership of water and a mere
right to use water, however, made a tremendous difference to
the Spear T plaintiff, a surface water appropriator harmed by
groundwater pumping. The court rejected Spear T’s attempt to
protect its “property” under a theory of conversion (an act of
dominion wrongfully asserted over another’s property), and left
Spear T to tort remedies.31 Likewise, Spear T’s claim against
the Department of Natural Resources for a taking of property
under the Nebraska Constitution was dismissed.32
Curiously, the court cited only groundwater-related 
precedent in holding that Spear T had no property interest in
its surface water.33 In Nebraska, groundwater is not subject to
private ownership; rather, it is owned by the state for the 
benefit of the public.34 Indeed, “Nebraska law has never 
considered ground water to be a market item freely transferable
for value among private parties.”35
Previous surface water cases had concluded just the 
opposite: that appropriators who complied with statutory
requirements did in fact possess vested property rights.36
In 1952, City of Scottsbluff v. Winters Creek Canal Co. invalidated an
ordinance that deemed open canals to be public nuisances and
required owners to fill them or construct water pipes.37
The court found that the ordinance was an arbitrary exercise of
the police power, and opined in dicta that it would result in
“confiscation of the company’s property without due process or
payment of just compensation.”38
The issue was addressed directly in Enterprise Irrigation
Dist. v. Willis.39 There, the court held that the 1895 Irrigation
Act, which limited appropriations to three acre-feet per acre,
was not intended to apply retroactively. It conceded that the
state may control the distribution of water to ensure beneficial
use and guard against waste by virtue of its police power, but
concluded that the statutory limitation could not be applied to
an appropriation that vested prior to enactment. “That an
appropriator of public water, who has complied with existing
statutory requirements, obtains a vested property right has been
announced by this court on many occasions.”40 The court 
continued that the state’s police power had never been expanded
so far as to allow the legislature “to destroy vested rights in 
private property when such rights are being exercised and such
property is being employed in the useful and in nowise 
harmful production of wealth” unless use of the property is
“shown to be inimical to public health or morals or to the 
general welfare.”41
Perhaps Spear T evidences an evolution in the law to reflect
modern social values, or perhaps the opinion is simply a more
reasoned application of the long-standing notion that water is
a “public want.” Whether an emerging trend in the law is a
deviation or merely a reflection of background principles of
property law is an issue often raised in regulatory takings cases.
State law takings jurisprudence typically follows Supreme
Court precedent under the U.S. Constitution, where a 
governmental regulation that goes “too far” in impacting 
private property will be considered a compensable taking.42
Once a property right is found to have been affected, courts
employ a fact-based balancing approach that considers the
effects of the regulation on reasonable investment-backed
expectations and the character of government action.43 In rare
cases where a regulatory action causes a physical invasion of the
property or denies all economically beneficial use, however, the
balancing test is not applied; rather, a per se taking will be
found.44 That is, compensation must be paid unless the interest
in question was already limited by a background principle of
law that inheres in the claimant’s title.45
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Although background principles are generally found in
state property law, when it comes to water, principles of federal
law can also impose an inherent limitation on the claimant’s
interest. In U.S. v. Rands, the Supreme Court concluded that
landowners adjacent to the Columbia River had no property
rights as against the United States in any interests subject to
the navigational servitude, including the flow of the water in
the river, access to the water, and other values attributable to
proximity to water: “these rights and values are not assertable
against the superior rights of the United States, [and] are not
property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment . . .”46
Conversely, in Tulare Lake v. U.S., the federal claims court
awarded irrigators some $20 million when the Bureau of
Reclamation curtailed contract allowances to provide flow for
endangered species.47 The court concluded that the plaintiffs
had vested property rights by virtue of their contracts and
California water law. Although there was “no dispute that [the
supplier’s] permits, and in turn plaintiffs’ contract rights, are
subject to the doctrines of reasonable use and public trust and
to the tenets of state nuisance law,” the court concluded that
only the state Water Resources Control Board could modify
the permit terms to reflect changing needs.48 Because the Board
had not done so during the period in question, the court
declined: the laws “require a complex balancing of interests
. . . and an exercise of discretion for which this court is not suited
and with which it is not charged.”49
The same court reached the opposite conclusion a few years
later in a case arising in Oregon, Klamath Irrigation District v.
U.S.50 There, summary judgment was granted to the United
States on the grounds that any interest the irrigators had in
Reclamation water was contractual and not property. The court
explicitly criticized the Tulare opinion for failing to assess the
underlying nature of the interest in question to discern whether
the plaintiffs in fact possessed property rights: “Tulare appears
to be wrong on some counts, incomplete in others and,
distinguishable, at all events.”51
Reluctant to delve into the nuances of the reasonable
use and public trust doctrines, [in Tulare,] the
Court of Federal Claims seized on [the Board’s
previous decision to grant the permit] . . . as the
conclusive definition of the water rights . . .
In essence, the court decided that an appropriator
is legally entitled to engage in (and has property
rights to) any conduct that is authorized by its
water rights permit or license. This interpretation
oversimplifies—and therefore misapprehends—
the nature of California water rights.52
Notably, the public trust doctrine is an inherent limitation
on interests in water, the exercise of which is not a taking.53
In California, at least, the public trust doctrine forms a 
fundamental component of the water rights system.
One distinction between California and Nebraska water law,
however, is that the California code has been construed as 
providing the Board with continuing jurisdiction over water
permits.54 Although the Nebraska Department of Natural
Resources has no parallel authority, it must remain vigilant
against forfeiture or waste and scrutinize new appropriations
and transfers to ensure that the public interest is satisfied.
Conclusion
What of the Nebraska Supreme Court’s bold stance that
“[a] right to appropriate surface water . . . is not an ownership
of property?” It appears legally defensible, at least as between an
appropriator and the state, on either of two grounds: (1) interests
in water are not property at all when asserted against the state,
acting to protect the public trust, or (2) interests in water are
only quasi-property, restricted by inherent public trust 
requirements and the innate physical limitations of water.
Arguably, the second rationale also justifies the dismissal of
Spear T’s property-based claims against groundwater pumpers,
although this result seems less convincing. The court’s sweeping
conclusion is most difficult to justify as applied to disputes
between individual surface water appropriators. An appropriator’s
right to use surface water vis a vis other appropriators is the
very essence of the prior appropriation system, and the
strongest stick in the appropriator’s bundle of rights. In order
for appropriators to execute water transfers, engage in water
banking, conserve instream flows, or engage in the myriad of
conventional beneficial uses, a clear characterization of what (if
any) incidents of property inhere in a water right must be 
delineated in law and interpreted consistently by the courts.
Moreover, adequate remedies for real world disputes between
users must be available to water rights holders in order for the
prior appropriation system to function and to evolve in a 
fashion that promotes both stability and the full range of values
associated with water.
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